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O n April 2, 1982, President Reagan signed into law the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982 (or the Act),' merging the United States
Court of Claims and Court of Custom and Patent Appeals into a new
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). This new
court has jurisdiction over appeals in contract and patent infringement
cases.2 The Act also replaces the former Court of Claims' trial division
with a new United States Claims Court. This court, inter alia, has been
invested with the jurisdiction to conduct trials in contract and patent
cases.$
Of particular interest to the government contracting community is the
provision of the Act regarding the contract formation or pre-award juris-
diction of the new Claims Court. This provision states that, in "contract
*Partner, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, Washington, D.C. B.A., Syracuse
University; LL.B., Yale University.
**Associated with Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin in Washington, D.C. B.S., Boston College;
J.D., New York University.
' Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified throughout sections of titles 2, 5, 7, 10,
15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 33, 35, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, and 50 app. U.S.C. (1982))
[hereinafter cited as Federal Courts Improvement Act].
2 For the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit see Federal Courts Improvement Act, § 127,
28 U.S.C. § 1295.
' For the jurisdiction of the Claims Court see Federal Courts Improvement Act, § 133(a),
28 U.S.C. § 1491.
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claims brought before the contract is awarded," the Claims Court has
"exclusive jurisdiction" to grant declaratory judgments and provide equi-
table relief, including, but not limited to, injunctive relief.4 With this ju-
risdiction, the Claims Court has the potential to provide the most effec-
tive forum for the resolution of protests against the award of federal
government contracts. Early decisions by the Claims Court defining both
the court's jurisdiction over pre-award issues and the scope of review in
cases found to be within the court's jurisdiction, however, raised substan-
tial fears whether that potential ever would be reached.' The March 23,
1983 decision of the new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
United States v. Grimberg Co. and subsequent Claims Court opinions
applying that decision now confirm those fears.7
I. THE PRE-ACT SITUATION: AN INCOMPLETE REMEDY
Unsuccessful competitors for government contracts long have sought a
forum-independent of the procuring agency-in which to protest the
agency's disposition of their bids or proposals. As early as 1853, the De-
partment of Justice refused to act as such a forum.' The federal courts
also refused to review agency procurement actions, with the Supreme
Court concluding in Perkins v. Lukens Steel CoY that the laws regulating
federal contract awards were enacted solely for the benefit of the govern-
ment and, therefore, that violations thereof were not redressable in fed-
eral court by unsuccessful bidders.1
Not until the 1920's was a forum available to protesters. The Comptrol-
ler General, in his capacity as the administrative head of the General Ac-
counting Office (GAO), was provided legislative authority to certify gov-
ernment disbursements and to provide advance decisions to government
officials relating to the agency's compliance with rules governing federal
contracts." By the mid-1920's the GAO, under the guise of its legislative
authority, began to issue decisions on agency awards at the behest of un-
successful bidders.
Although federal contractors were happy to find a forum in which to
present their protests, the limitations inherent in this non-judicial process
4 Federal Courts Improvement Act, § 133(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(3).
I See Feidelman, Schnitzer & Ursini, Claims Court's Ability to Realize Potential in
Doubt, LEGAL TIMES OF WASHINGTON (Nov. 1, 1982); see also Moskowitz, Alternative Court
for Contract Appeals is Confusing Bidders, Washington Post, Jan. 24, 1983 (Washington
Business), at 27, col. 1.
6 702 F.2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
See Feidelman & Ursini, Federal Circuit Limits Jurisdiction Over Bid Protests, LEGAL
TIMES OF WASHINGTON (Apr. 18, 1983).
8 See 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 226 (1853).
9 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
10 Id. at 129.
" See 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1976).
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were recognized. For example, the GAO never had and still has no au-
thority to enjoin contract awards or the performance of contracts
awarded while a protest is pending; it had and has no due process proce-
dure for resolving material issues of fact; and it could not and cannot
authorize discovery to enable a protester to obtain information necessary
to prove its case-information that often is in the sole possession of the
government. The GAO thus provided a welcome, but often ineffective,
forum for competitors seeking review of agency procurement actions.
Because of the limitations on the remedies available at the GAO, the
search for another more effective forum continued even after the GAO
bid protest process had become well-established.12 Success was finally
achieved in 1970 with the landmark decision in Scanwell Laboratories,
Inc. v. Shaf/er,"3 in which the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia held that "disappointed bidders" '14 on government contracts have
standing under section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)"5
to seek judicial review of agency procurement actions. This right of po-
tential government contractors to obtain judicial review of agency pro-
curement actions is commonly referred to as the "Scanwell doctrine."
An understanding of the Scanwell doctrine must begin with the Su-
preme Court's decision in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co."6 In Perkins, the
Supreme Court held that disappointed bidders do not have standing to
challenge federal procurement actions.' 7 The court stressed that federal
bidding procedures"6 were established for the benefit of the public gener-
ally and not for the benefit of bidders.
Perkins, however, was decided prior to enactment of the APA. In
Scanwell, the court of appeals held that the doctrine enunciated in Per-
kins did not survive the APA, which was enacted to guarantee federal
" The bid protest procedure at the GAO has seen increased use over the years. By way of
example, the GAO in fiscal year 1982 handled approximately 2,400 bid protest cases.
.3 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
"4 The term "disappointed bidder" is used interchangeably with the term "unsuccessful
bidder" or "frustrated bidder" and includes contractors who are "seeking to overturn the
Government's award of a contract to a competing bidder or to enjoin an award yet to be
made." Simpson Electric Co. v. Seamans, 317 F. Supp. 684, 685 (D.D.C. 1970). The term
apparently was first used by the district court in United States v. Stewart, 234 F. Supp. 94
(D.D.C.), aff'd, 339 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1964), a post-award mandamus action in which
plaintiff sought to compel award of a contract to it after rejection of its bid. As used
throughout this article, the term "bidder," which generally refers to competitors who submit
bids in response to a formally advertised invitation for bids, will be used to refer to both
bidders and "offerors" who submit proposals in response to requests for proposals in negoti-
ated procurements.
" The APA provides in pertinent part: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
10 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
Id. at 132.
18 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2301 (Supp. V 1981).
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court access to plaintiffs injured by the failure of government officials to
follow their own regulations. 19 The Scanwell court engaged in a lengthy
analysis of both the APA and the cases decided under it, paying particu-
lar attention to the following language in the Supreme Court's decision in
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner:20
[A] survey of our cases shows that judicial review of a final
agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless
there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of
Congress. . . . [O]nly upon a showing of "clear and convincing
evidence" of a contrary legislative intent should the courts re-
strict access to judicial review.2 1
The Scanwell court then concluded that not only was there no evidence
of a contrary legislative intent with respect to judicial review of agency
procurement actions, but that "[iff anything, the legislative intent with
respect to the field of government contracting in general seems to run in
precisely the opposite direction, that is, in favor of review. "22
Although Scanwell appeared to provide a judicial forum for full resolu-
tion of bid protests, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit soon developed a tendency to combine the GAO's expertise on the
merits with the court's injunctive authority; i.e., the courts issued short-
term injunctive relief pending a GAO decision on the merits. 2 While this
solution had much to commend it, the GAO procedures-which generally
still were used to resolve the substantive issues-lacked provision for for-
mal resolution of factual disputes and provided no effective means similar
to discovery by which the protester could obtain the information neces-
sary to develop its case.
The marriage of the GAO protest process and the court's injunctive
powers may well have been motivated by the latter's unfamiliarity with
government procurement regulations. Congress deemed it important to
create a forum combining the power to provide effective relief with the
expertise to deal with substantive issues. Indeed, the greater expertise of
the Claims Court judges in this area was part of the rationale for the
creation of the Federal Courts Improvement Act legislation.2
II. THE FEDERAL COURTS IMPROVEMENT ACT AND CREATION OF AN
ALTERNATIVE BID PROTEST FORUM
Congress, recognizing the limitations of the GAO and the reluctance of
"9 424 F.2d at 866.
20 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
Id. at 140-41 (citations omitted).
22 424 F.2d at 866.
23 See Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
21 See S. REP. No. 304, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1979).
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the federal courts to interfere with a process about which they knew little
or nothing, attempted in the Act to combine the advantages of a forum
having both specialized knowledge and the enforcement powers of a fed-
eral court. The result was the creation of the United States Claims Court
with the new "exclusive" jurisdiction over contract claims "brought
before the contract is awarded." Section 133(a) of the Act provides in
full:
To afford complete relief on any contract claim brought before
the contract is awarded, the court shall have exclusive jurisdiction
to grant declaratory judgments and such equitable and extraordi-
nary relief as it deems proper, including but not limited to injunc-
tive relief. In exercising this jurisdiction, the court shall give due
regard to the interest of national defense and national security.
2 5
Serious questions about the proper interpretation of this language arose
during the very first week of the Claims Court's life, resulting in the
March 23, 1983, en banc decision by the new Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC) in United States v. Grimberg Co.
26
A. Background of the Grimberg Co. Decision
The operative facts of Grimberg Co. are simple. Briefly, while Grimberg
and its co-complainant Schlosser each brought suit under a different so-
licitation, a third contractor-Parker-had been the low bidder on both
General Services Administration (GSA) procurements. Grimberg and
Schlosser each filed protests with the contracting officer in mid-Septem-
ber 1982, and the contracting officer on Schlosser's solicitation even
stated in writing that Schlosser would be advised of the decision on the
protest before an award was made.2 7 When neither Grimberg nor
Schlosser had heard from the contracting officers by the end of Septem-
ber, they jointly filed a complaint and motions for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief with the Claims Court on October 4, 1982. A hearing was held
on October 5, 1982 at which time the government filed a motion to dis-
miss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the GSA had awarded
both contracts to Parker before the complaint had been filed.2' The gov-
ernment's motion to dismiss on October 5 was the first time that the
plaintiffs learned that award had been made. Judge Willi of the Claims
Court granted the motions for lack of jurisdiction under section 133(a) of
"8 Federal Courts Improvement Act, § 133(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(3).
26 702 F.2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Although the matter originally was argued before a five-
judge panel on November 1, 1982, the court sua sponte determined that the issues
presented therein were so important that consideration en banc by the court was required.
Reargument before the full court, therefore, was held on February 7, 1983.
"' Id. at 1364.
28 Id.
1983-84]
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the Act and transferred the case to a district court pursuant to sec-
tion 301(a).2 On October 8, 1982 the government appealed the order of
transfer and on October 13, 1982 the plaintiffs filed a cross-appeal and
motion to stay the transfer motion pending appeal. On October 18, 1982
the Claims Court granted the stay and the CAFC agreed to expedited
briefing and argument of the case.3 0
The Grimberg Co. case raised several important questions of interpre-
tation. For example, is a "claim"-the term used in the Act-the same as
a "complaint"? If a "claim" is filed with the contracting officer before
award, is that action sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Claims
Court? The plaintiffs argued that since they had filed protests with the
contracting officers prior to award, the Claims Court had jurisdiction to
review the contracting officer's de facto denial of that protest.3 ' The
Claims Court rejected this contention, holding that it has jurisdiction in
disappointed bidder actions only where the complaint has been filed with
the court prior to award of the contract.2 The Claims Court, however,
relying on the legislative history of the Federal Courts Improvement Act,
transferred the case to the federal district court pursuant to sec-
tion 301(a) of the Act,s making an express assumption that federal dis-
trict courts retain jurisdiction over post-award suits for equitable relief.3 4
The CAFC, in a 6-4-1 decision, s8 affirmed the Claims Court's decision.
The CAFC's opinion, however, while purporting to define the Claims
Court's contract formation jurisdiction, raises so many other issues that
the actual parameters of the Claims Court's pre-award jurisdiction are
still unclear.
B. Analysis of the Grimberg Co. Opinion
The six-member Grimberg Co. majority, in an opinion written by Chief
29 Id.
30 Expeditious consideration of these basic jurisdictional issues was necessary because of
the number of bid protest cases that generally are filed in the autumn months. Septem-
ber 30, the end of the government's fiscal year, usually finds agencies conducting numerous
procurements where contracts must be awarded by the end of the year or the funds lost.
Indeed, in Grimberg Co., the GSA allegedly awarded the contracts to Parker swiftly for just
this reason.
81 702 F.2d at 1365.
32 Grimberg Co. v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 253, 256 (Cl. Ct. 1982).
11 Section 301(a) of the Act provides express authority for the transfer in situations
where the court finds that it does not have jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1631(a) (1982).
31 1 Cl. Ct. at 256.
35 Judge Nichols concurred in the majority opinion by Chief Judge Markey but noted
that "[t]he main trouble with the statute as construed by our majority is that it achieves an
insignificant and absurd result." 702 F.2d at 1378 (Nichols, J., concurring). Two dissenting
opinions, joined by all four dissenting judges, were filed. This split of opinion in such an
important case may invite Supreme Court review. As of this writing, however, neither party
has petitioned the Court for a writ of certiorari.
[Vol. 32:41
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Judge Markey, affirmed the Claims Court's decision in full and thereby
created a bifurcated procedure by which unsuccessful competitors for
government contracts may seek redress for improper agency procurement
actions. Based on what is referred to as the "strict construction" doctrine
of statutory interpretation, the CAFC majority ruled that disappointed
bidders may seek relief in the Claims Court only if a complaint is filed
before award of the contract sought. 6 Once award is made by the agency,
bidders must seek relief in federal district court.
1. Claims Court Jurisdiction
The majority arrived at its bifurcated conclusion after a lengthy and
tortured dissection and analysis of virtually every word of the sec-
tion 133(a) jurisdictional provision, with the major emphasis on the legis-
lative history-or, more accurately, the CAFC's interpretation of the leg-
islative history-of the Federal Courts Improvement Act. What is
disturbing about the court's opinion is that its interpretation of the legis-
lative history evidences some misconceptions about the realities of the
government procurement process as a whole, and the nature and scope of
judicial intervention in that process in particular.
By way of example, the majority, in determining that Congress in-
tended to limit the Claims Court's injunctive powers to pre-award situa-
tions only, relied heavily on section 133(a) which admonishes that, in ex-
ercising its new equitable powers, the Claims Court must "give due regard
to the interests of national defense and national security. ' '37 The court
then made the following statements:
That caution would appear particularly applicable to court-cre-
ated delays in awarding contracts. In a post-award suit, the con-
tract has been awarded, and the procurement process itself is not
normally delayed while the court is considering the merits of a
disappointed bidder's complaint. . . . In essence, Congress in-
tended to limit exercise of equitable powers by the Claims Court
to the pre-award stage (without regard to whether a claim had
been filed with a contracting officer), and to avoid the exercise of
those powers by that court in the post-award, administration
stage. 8
These statements show an alarming unfamiliarity with the government
procurement process as well as a basic ignorance of the difference be-
tween pre-award issues and contract administration issues.
First, these statements ignore the fact that the plaintiffs in Scanwell
and in numerous other disappointed bidder actions in district courts
36 702 F.2d at 1374.
17 Id. at 1368.
38 Id. at 1368-69.
1983-841
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brought suit after award had been made, seeking exactly the delay in the
procurement process that the CAFC seemed loathe to countenance. The
court itself agreed that the district courts still hold a congressional man-
date to continue to grant equitable relief in post-award situations. If Con-
gress is willing to permit post-award intervention by the district courts,
why not permit post-award intervention by the Claims Court? As Judge
Nichols pointed out in his concurring opinion:
There was surely nothing to show that intermeddling by the
Claims Court would be more harmful than intermeddling by a
district judge, or that intermeddling by the former would be more
harmful after award than intermeddling before award, or that in-
termeddling by a district judge, on the contrary, would be less
harmful after award than before. 9
Thus, the CAFC's rationale that Congress did not intend that there bejudicial intervention in the procurement process after award makes no
sense in light of the court's acknowledgement that such intervention may
and will continue-with congressional approval, no less-in the district
courts.
Second, the majority's statements reveal a misunderstanding of Con-
gress' concern over possible court intervention in contract "administra-
tion" matters versus pre-award matters. Simply because a suit is filed
after award of a contract does not mean that the court would be interfer-
ing with the "administration" of that contract. "Administration" of a
contract involves matters related to the performance by an awardee
under the contract, not to the procurement of the contract itself. The
Comptroller General has held in literally hundreds 40 of cases that a "con-
tract administration" matter is any issue that does not affect the validity
of the award.4' Just as the mere existence of a contract-related issue does
not convert every action to a "contract claim, '42 the mere fact that a bid
" Id. at 1378-79 (Nichols, J., concurring).
40 A quick review of the index of Comptroller General decisions indicates that for the
1980-82 period alone the GAO has held in 163 cases that protests involving issues not rele-
vant to the propriety of award are matters of "contract administration" and not properly for
Comptroller General review.
" See, e.g., Tenavision, Inc., B-209261, December 15, 1982, 82-2 CPD 1 533; Springhill
Printing, B-206529, March 15, 1982, 82-1 CPD 1 244; Welch Allyn, B-206193.2, March 2,
1982, 82-1 CPD 1 187.
4" For instance, in Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the circuit
court reversed the district court's ruling that it had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for
injunctive relief to restrain the disclosure of technical data. The district court had held that
the issues were "contract-related" and, as such were within the exclusive province of the
former Court of Claims. The circuit court noted that the plaintiff's suit had contract over-
tones but that it did not seek the enforcement of rights or expectations bottomed on a
contract. Id. at 969-70. Cf. Indian Wells Valley Metal Trades Council v. United States, 553
F. Supp. 397, 399 n.5 (Cl. Ct. 1982) (court lacked jurisdiction suit to enjoin award of gov-
ernment contract; remedy, if any, was in district court under the APA).
[Vol. 32:41
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protest claim is filed after award does not convert the matter to one in-
volving "contract administration."
The Grimberg Co. majority relied heavily on Congress' alleged concern
over protecting contract administration matters from court interference
as support for the pre-award/post-award jurisdictional dichotomy. This
reliance on congressional concern, however, is suspect in light of the
Claims Court's own procedural rules. Under Claims Court Rule 27, a
plaintiff may file a brief preliminary complaint which can be amended
after discovery is obtained. The complaint need not immediately state a
claim for equitable relief. Thus, in Management and Technical Services
Co. v. United States,43 the plaintiff filed a preliminary complaint before
award of the contract to the successful offeror; however, it did not file a
motion for injunctive relief until after award. Neither the Justice Depart-
ment nor the Claims Court in that case seemed to have had any concerns
about the court's jurisdiction to grant equitable relief if necessary in that
post-award stage. Subsequent Claims Court decisions,44 however, have ad-
dressed this issue and the question has how been decided by the CAFC.45
Indeed, in Grimberg Co., the government even admitted at the Novem-
ber 1, 1982, oral argument that so long as a complaint was filed before
award, the Claims Court had jurisdiction to grant equitable relief."6 The
majority opinion, however, patently ignored this inconsistency in its
rationale.
The majority's opinion also is distressing because it indicates a lack of
understanding of the scope of a court's equitable powers in general. The
majority made the unusual blanket statements that "[t]he court obvi-
ously could not 'enjoin the award' of contracts already awarded. Nor
would a declaratory judgment be appropriate after award."' 7 The CAFC
failed to note that district courts can and will enjoin the award of al-
ready-awarded contracts by ordering the procuring agency to issue a sus-
pension of work notice or an order not to proceed until there has been a
decision on the merits.48 Moreover, if a district court concludes that an
agency has acted improperly, it can and will declare the already-awarded
contract to be invalid.49 Finally, district courts can and will issue declara-
"S No. 531-82C (Cl. Ct. filed Dec. 2, 1982).
" See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
'5 F. Alderete Gen. Contractors v. United States, No. 83-1003 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (argued
Aug. 4, 1983).
46 This admission prompted Judge Davis to note that bidders may be well-advised to file
a Rule 27 complaint at the time they submit their bids, in order to assure themselves of the
availability of the Claims Court forum.
" 702 F.2d at 1372.
48 See John Carlo, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 539 F. Supp. 1075 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (dissolving
preliminary injunction issued after award enjoining Corps from issuing a "notice to pro-
ceed" and from initiating any performance until issuance of decision by Office of Comptrol-
ler General and further order of the court).
41 See Robert E. Derecktor of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 506 F. Supp. 1059
1983-84]
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tory judgments after award, especially where injunctive relief may be in-
appropriate, or progress on the contract has so far advanced that injunc-
tive relief is impractical.5 0 In sum, as noted by Judge Kashiwa in his
dissenting opinion, "[the] fallacy with the majority's argument lies with
its failure to appreciate prior government contract law."'"
2. Federal District Court Jurisdiction
A second major issue raised by Grimberg Co. was whether the federal
district court retained Scanwell jurisdiction even after enactment of the
Federal Courts Improvement Act. To its credit-and to the relief of con-
tractors and their counsel throughout the country-the CAFC unani-
mously held that Congress did not intend to deprive district courts of
post-award jurisdiction in disappointed bidder actions. The Justice De-
partment had contended that once award has been made not even the
district courts have jurisdiction to review agency procurement actions and
grant equitable relief. The Justice Department's position would have
given contracting officers the ability to avoid any review whatsoever by
making award before notifying the unsuccessful bidders or offerors. The
CAFC properly rejected this contention as clearly contrary to congres-
sional intent, noting that the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia had ruled twice that post-award suits can be maintained in
the district courts.52 The CAFC can take comfort in knowing that not
only the District of Columbia, but every district court that has considered
the issue since passage of the Act, has held that disappointed bidders in
post-award situations may seek relief in the district courts.5 3
Interestingly enough, the majority specifically declined to consider
whether district courts, by operation of the "exclusive" language in sec-
(D.R.I. 1980) (award of contract to third- lowest bidder declared invalid as arbitrary, capri-
cious, and without rational basis where lower bids were rejected on basis of improperly in-
terpreted technicality).
'0 For instance, Aero Corp. v. Department of the Navy, 549 F. Supp. 39 (D.D.C. 1982),
held that although further affirmative injunctive relief was not in the public interest, the
court would consider plaintiff's entitlement to declaratory judgment, damages, attorneys'
fees for government misconduct, etc. The final decision in this protracted litigation was
issued on February 16, 1983. The court held that the enactment of the Act did not prevent
its consideration of Aero's post-award protest and that "declaration of legal rights in this
case should deter future violations of the procurement laws." 558 F. Supp. 404, 410 (D.D.C.
1983); see also Simpson Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 317 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1970) (injunctive
relief not required in order to maintain integrity of the bid process where a declaration of
rights and the corresponding liability for damages would suffice).
" 702 F.2d at 1380 (Kashiwa, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1376 n.22 (citing Opal Mfg. Co. v. UMC Indus., 533 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982),
and American Dist. Tel. v. Department of Energy, 555 F. Supp. 1244 (D.D.C. 1983)).
53 See Dawson v. GSA, No. 82-2954-G (D. Mass. Oct. 24, 1982); Goex, Inc. v. Wein-
berger, No. 3-82-1645F (N.D. Tex. 1982).
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tion 133(a), are denied jurisdiction over pre-award suits."'
C. Post-Grimberg Co. Claims Court Decisions and the Effect of the
Opinion
Judge Bennett, in his separate dissenting opinion, astutely pointed out
the serious practical problems with the majority's resolution of the
Grimberg Co. case:
[T]he majority's interpretation would, in many instances, give the
contracting officer the power to prevent the contractor from seek-
ing equitable relief in the Claims Court by awarding the contract
before rendering a decision on the claim, as happened here. This
creates a paradoxical situation in which the contracting officer,
whose allegedly illegal action forms the basis for the bid protest,
is granted the power to determine for the contractor the forum in
which he must press suit.
.. . [T]he ultimate result of the majority's holding that the
Claims Court lacks jurisdiction will be greater judicial interfer-
ence in the contracting process. The arbitrary cut-off or loss of
jurisdiction after award will, as noted by Judge Kashiwa, result in
a race to the courthouse to file premature litigation to ensure that
a bidder is not denied access to the Claims Court.55
This pre-award/post-award distinction will have its greatest effect in the
negotiated contract arena. As Judge Kashiwa pointed out in his dissent,
the largest and most complex contracts are negotiated, not formally ad-
vertised.5" This is especially true in defense procurements. An unsuccess-
ful offeror frequently has no indication of possible irregularities in the
procurement until after the contract is awarded to a competitor. The
CAFC's decision thus means that the Claims court will be unavailable for
review of large defense and civilian procurements. Ironically, this will bar
Claims Court review of the procurements where the most dollars are at
stake, and where contractors normally would be willing to seek judicial
intervention instead of pursuing the less costly, but more time-consum-
ing, GAO process.
Whether right or wrong, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's
decision in Grimberg Co. appeared to have set forth an easy rule of juris-
diction: if the contract sought has not been awarded, the disappointed
bidder may obtain equitable relief in the Claims Court; if the contract
sought has been awarded, the disappointed bidder may obtain equitable
relief in the district courts; and if the bidder is not sure whether the con-
tract has been awarded, Grimberg Co. suggests that he would be well-
702 F.2d at 1374.
Id. at 1388 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1379 n.1 (Kashiwa, J., dissenting).
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advised to file in both forums, or, in the case of a negotiated procure-
ment, file a Rule 27 complaint with the Claims Court when he submits
his offer. Unfortunately, however, what at first appeared to be an "easy
rule" is now quite difficult in light of post-Grimberg Co. jurisdictional
interpretations issued by several Claims Court judges.
As if the analysis in Grimberg Co. were not tortured enough, subse-
quent opinions by various Claims Court judges seeking to interpret and
apply the Grimberg Co. guidelines have evidenced even greater absurdity.
These decisions are distressing because they reflect not only an ignorance
of judicial precedent in federal procurement law, but also an ignorance of
basic federal court practice as well.
Perhaps the most disturbing post-Grimberg Co. decisions have been
F. Alderete General Contractors v. United States57 and Big Bud Trac-
tors, Inc. v. United States,58 in which Judge Merow and Chief Judge
Kozinski, respectively, held that the Claims Court had no jurisdiction to
enjoin performance of a contract, even if the complaint had been filed
prior to the time the contract is awarded. According to these two judges,
the Claims Court could be ousted from its equitable jurisdiction by the
unilateral act of the government in awarding a contract after the com-
plaint has been filed.
As noted earler,5 9 even the Justice Department had not been so bold as
to suggest that a party may unilaterally take action that would operate to
deprive the court of jurisdiction. Several other Claims Court judges had
stated, in declining to follow Alderete and Big Bud, that the basic federal
court precedent establishes that once jurisdiction attaches, subsequent
actions by a party cannot deprive the court of jurisdiction. 0 The plaintiff
in Alderete filed an appeal with the CAFC and the government filed a
brief in support of the contractor, stating that the ruling "creates an in-
tolerable procedure for bid protest cases" that is "unfair to litigants, their
counsel and the Court."'" On August 23, 1983, the CAFC reversed the
Claims Court holding in Alderete,6 2 adopting Judge Harkins' rationale in
Dean Forwarding Co. v. United States,63 and adding that such a result is
necessary so as not to deprive a protestor of any forum in which to bring
his claim for equitable relief.
A second group of post-Grimberg Co. Claims Court decisions that will
wreak havoc on government contractors are those that have focused on
67 2 Cl. Ct. 184 (1983).
2 Cl. Ct. 195 (1983).
6 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
60 Dean Forwarding Co., Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 559 (1983); Systems Architects,
Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 456 (1983); ATL, Inc. v. United States, No. 442-83C (Cl. Ct.
filed July 18, 1983).
61 40 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 240 (Aug. 15, 1983).
6 No. 83-1003 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
63 2 Cl. Ct. 559 (1983).
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the requirement that plaintiffs have a "contract claim" before the court
may exercise its equitable jurisdiction. In decisions such as Ingersoll-
Rand v. United States,"' Chief Judge Kozinski noted that Congress re-
ferred to two different contracts in the 1491(a)(3) phrase "contract claim
brought before the contract is awarded." The first "contract" is the im-
plied-in-fact contract that the government fairly consider a bid or propo-
sal. This contract is to be distinguished from the second "contract" which
is that sought to be awarded by the government. According to Judge
Kozinski, the implied-in-fact contract arises only upon submission by a
bidder of a bid responsive to the solicitation,6 and a claim under such
implied-in-fact contract can be made only if the government is alleged to
have unfairly considered a plaintiff's bid or proposal. Therefore, held
Judge Kozinski, a bidder cannot challenge the terms of the solication be-
cause the solicitation comes into existence prior to the implied contract.
Thus, under the Ingersoll-Rand rationale, a bidder would have no judicial
forum in which to challenge an alleged impropriety in the solicitation
itself.
In another decision, Downtown Copy Center v. United States," Judge
Margolis ruled that the Claims Court did not have jurisdiction over a
plaintiff's claim asserting unfairness in the solicitation itself because the
government owes no contractual duty to bidders to comply with procure-
ment regulations-hence, there can be no "contract" claim. Although
Judge Margolis acknowledges that there is a statutory duty under the
APA that the government obey its own regulations, he holds that the
Claims Court does not have any jurisdiction over such claims of breach of
the statutory duty.6 7 Drawn to its logical conclusion, the decision in
Downtown Copy Center would mean that the Claims Court has exclusive
jurisdiction only over contract claims brought before a contract is
awarded, but that exclusivity would not extend to statutory claims
brought before the contract is awarded. In other words, federal district
courts would have the same pre-award jurisdiction that they had under
the APA Scanwell doctrine, a result that is totally inconsistent with the
CAFC's decision in Grimberg Co., although, ironically, probably quite
consistent with congressional intent.
Although it is not possible to discuss here each of the post-Grimberg
Co. Claims Court decisions in detail, a brief review of these cases indi-
6, 2 Cl. Ct. 373 (1983).
6 Thus, in Gibraltar Indus., Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 589 (1983), the court held
that it did not have jurisdiction over a claim filed by a large business under a small-business
set-aside procurement because a large business could not be responsive to such a solicitation
and, therefore, no implied contract arose between the bidder and the government.
"' No. 454-83C (Cl. Ct. filed July 27, 1983).
6 The decision is totally contrary to that in P. Francini & Co., Inc. v. United States,
No. 28-83C (Cl. Ct. filed Mar. 1, 1983), in which Judge White construes "contract claim" to
include a claim that the government has violated some procurement regulation.
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cates a frightening trend on the part of some members of that court to
restrict Claims Court jurisdiction beyond the absurdity noted by Judge
Nichols in Grimberg Co. Congress' clear intent to create a second alterna-
tive forum for disappointed bidders looks like it may be emasculated to
the point of having no forum at all for vindication of the rights estab-
lished under the APA.
III. CONCLUSION
Congress' attempt to establish an alternative but effective bid protest
forum has been thwarted for the majority of important procurements.
The Grimberg Co. court did confirm that the federal district courts still
may serve as a forum in which disappointed bidders can seek relief under
certain circumstances. However, this remedy is little more than bidders
had before enactment of the Federal Courts Improvement Act. To be
sure, Judge Nichols was correct in observing that the CAFC's decision
"achieves an insignificant and absurd result."'8 The "race to the court-
house" has begun, and it remains to be seen whether the finish line will
be the steps of Congress or the Supreme Court.
11 702 F.2d at 1378.
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